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Introduction
The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (Billc-31), introduced in April 2000, includes somemeasures that will improve upon Canada’s system
of refugee determination. These include an expanded defi-
nition of those deserving of protection and an appeal on
the merits of rejected claims. That being said, the most spe-
cialized and fair procedure is of little value if one does not
have access to its processes. And make no mistake, limiting
access to refugee protection in Canada is precisely the in-
tent of the Canadian legislators who introduced Bill c-31
into Parliament. Under its provisions, fewer people will be
able to benefit from Canada’s asylum procedures. This is a
consequence of increased overseas interdiction of those
seeking to come to Canada to make refugee claims, an ex-
panded definition of who is ineligible to have his or her
claim heard by the Immigration and Refugee Board (irb),
and limited access to a new pre-removal risk assessment.
Interdiction
The provisions of Bill c-31 do not mention increased over-
seas interdiction, but the intent of the government is clear
from media releases and statements made around the time
of the Bill’s introduction. In a press release, the Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration declares that one goal of the
new legislation is to “close the backdoor to those who would
abuse the system.”1 As a way of achieving that goal, the
Minister declares that she has secured funding for “stepped-
up overseas interdiction.”2
The same press material notes that increased overseas
interdiction means “[m]ore immigration control officers
stationed at our offices abroad to direct genuine refugees
to appropriate missions or international organizations
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while preventing undocumented persons from seeking ir-
regular channels of migration to Canada.”3 The stated pur-
pose of this action is “to discourage those not in need of
protection from coming to Canada through irregular
means.”4
The phrase “at our offices” abroad is, I believe, mislead-
ing. It suggests a place of meeting and discussion. In fact,
most interdiction by Canadian officials occurs at overseas
airports, where the documents of persons boarding Cana-
dian-bound planes are checked. “At our offices” suggests
an investigatory, even conciliatory, approach. The reality
of “at the airport” reveals a much more enforcement-
oriented process.
The enforcement mentality is revealed as well in lan-
guage used by the government to describe its interdiction
policy. For example, non-genuine refugee claimants are
described as “undocumented persons” and those seeking
to come to Canada through “irregular means.” As Amnesty
International observes in its brief on Bill c-31,
Sometimes the only way that genuine refugees can escape
persecution in their own countries and seek asylum abroad is
through “irregular channels” and by means of false documen-
tation. The language in the [press material], however, sug-
gests that “undocumented persons” “seeking irregular chan-
nels of migration to Canada” are not “genuine refugees.” In
our experience, in many cases, nothing could be further from
the truth. It is this apparent misconception of what consti-
tutes a “genuine refugee” which raises our concern about the
welfare and safety of those interdicted abroad.5
The government promises that “genuine refugees” shall
be directed to “appropriate missions or international or-
ganizations.” That, however, should not be confused with
actually offering protection to those refugees or even en-
suring that they have access to a fair determination. Be-
sides, the proposal is premised on a false assumption—that
one can easily distinguish a “genuine refugee” from one
who is not genuine. As is evident to anyone who has ever
been involved in a refugee hearing, that determination is,
as a rule, not simple at all. It is far more complicated than
merely confirming the validity of one’s passport. Moreo-
ver, “immigration control officers,” whose very title reveals
their primary purpose, are neither suited nor trained to
determine who is a “genuine refugee.”
Were the Canadian government serious about protect-
ing bona fide refugees, it would cease overseas interdiction.
As the unhcr notes, “the most effective way to ensure the
integrity of asylum systems is not to erect barriers but
rather, to process applications fairly and expeditiously [in
the country of asylum].”6 That involves “consistency in de-
cision-making and the timely removal of rejected asylum-
seekers.”7
At the very least, Canadian officials abroad should be
satisfied that persons wishing to claim refugee status in
Canada have access to an authority in another country be-
fore which they can exercise their right to seek asylum. That
country must be a signatory to the 1951 Convention and be
recognized as one that upholds its obligations under the
Convention, in policy and practice. If such a referral is not
possible, asylum-seekers should be allowed to continue
their voyage to Canada.8
Ineligibility
Restricted Access to the Refugee Board under the
Current Legislation
Since 1989, there has been an eligibility screening for all
refugee claimants in Canada. That is, not all persons claim-
ing to be refugees are allowed to have their claims heard by
the Convention Refugee Determination Division (crdd)
of the irb. Under the Immigration Act, determinations of
eligibility are made by immigration officers.9 Persons not
eligible to have their claims referred to the crdd include:
• those who have been recognized as Convention refu-
gees by another country, to which they can be returned10
• those previously determined not to be Convention
refugees, or to have abandoned their claim, or deter-
mined not to be eligible to make a claim11
• those determined to be Convention refugees, under
either the Immigration Act or the regulations12
• those determined by an adjudicator to have commit-
ted or been convicted of a serious crime, either in
Canada or abroad, and who, in the Minister’s opin-
ion, constitutes a danger to the public13
• those determined by an adjudicator to be inadmissi-
ble for reasons of security, involvement with organ-
ized crime, war crimes or crimes against humanity,
or for holding a senior position in a government
complicit in human rights violations and whose
claims, in the opinion of the Minister, it would be
contrary to the public interest to have heard in
Canada.
Under current legislation, those previously determined
not to be Convention refugees can overcome this obstacle
to eligibility by remaining out of the country for ninety
days. After that period, failed refugee claimants returning
to Canada will again have access to the crdd for a determi-
nation of their claims.14
On a number of occasions, the legislative scheme of lim-
iting access to the crdd has been challenged for being in
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violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
particularly of sections 7 and 15 (1).15 In every case, the Fed-
eral Court has upheld the constitutionality of the eligibil-
ity provisions.16
Notwithstanding the Canadian jurisprudence, it is
doubtful that the drafters of the 1951 Refugee Convention
envisaged a system in which some asylum seekers would
be unable to present their claims before the decision-
making authority. Certainly, no article of the 1951 Conven-
tion specifically bars applicants from access to a refugee
determination process. Under the Convention, persons may
be excluded from refugee protection or may cease to be Con-
vention refugees, but these exclusionary and cessation
clauses do not envisage the absence of a refugee determi-
nation at all. By definition, cessation is an act that occurs
after someone first has been determined to be a Conven-
tion refugee. As for excluding undeserving claimants from
refugee protection, this too comes after an initial finding
of inclusion. Notes the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees’ Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for De-
termining Refugee Status,
The inclusion clauses define the criteria that a person must
satisfy in order to be a refugee. They form the positive basis
upon which the determination of refugee status is made. The
. . . exclusion clauses . . . enumerate the circumstances in which
a person is excluded from the application of the 1951 Conven-
tion although meeting the positive criteria of the inclusion clauses
(emphasis added).17
The unhcr has long been of the view that “automatic
bars to consideration of asylum claims are not in conform-
ity with the 1951 Convention.”18 Decisions on entitlement
to refugee protection are often complex and challenging,
and should be made by the authority with expertise and
training in refugee law and status determination. In its sub-
mission to the House of Commons Standing Committee
on Citizenship and Immigration, the unhcr stated that
the right under Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution
“can only be exercised if the asylum-seeker has the oppor-
tunity to have his or her claim heard by an authority com-
petent to do so. Asylum-seekers therefore must have access
both to the territory of countries where persecution can be
sought, and to the asylum procedures in those countries.”19
Canada was also criticized for limiting access to its refu-
gee determination process by the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights, in a report issued in February
2000.20 Basing its analysis on articles of the American Dec-
laration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the Commis-
sion, although acknowledging that some claimants may be
ineligible to have their claim determined, were concerned
that eligibility screenings are conducted by immigration
officers and not the Board. In its report, the Commission
stated,
The right to seek asylum necessarily requires that asylum seek-
ers have the opportunity to effectively state their claim before
a fully competent decision-maker. While applicable interna-
tional law leaves the decision as to which procedural means
are necessary to accomplish this to the national authorities,
the Commission shares the view of the unhcr that eligibility
determinations are best made by those tasked with interpret-
ing and applying refugee law and policy.21
As we shall see, the views of the unhcr and Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights are not reflected
in the draft legislation, Bill c-31. In fact, access to refugee
determination—indeed, to refugee protection—is even
more limited under the proposed new law.
Reforms under Bill c-31
In Bill c-31, the proposed Immigration and Protection Act,
some of the terminology on refugee claims has changed.
The Convention Refugee Determination Division, for ex-
ample, becomes the Refugee Protection Division (rpd) of
the Immigration and Refugee Board.22 In addition to de-
termining people to be Convention refugees, the Division
also has the power to declare applicants to be persons “in
need of protection.” The latter, with a number of excep-
tions, include those likely to face torture or cruel and unu-
sual treatment or punishment, if removed from Canada.
The system of screening refugee claimants for eligibility to
have their claims heard by the Board, however, remains in
place in the proposed legislation. In fact, the grounds for
prohibiting access to the Board have been expanded.
Pursuant to section 95 (1) of the Bill, the following per-
sons are ineligible to have their refugee claims referred to
the rpd:
• those previously granted or refused refugee protec-
tion under the Act23
• those previously determined to be ineligible to have
their claim referred to the prd, or whose claims have
been withdrawn or abandoned24
• those recognized as Convention refugees by a coun-
try other than Canada, to which they can be returned25
• those determined to be inadmissible on the grounds
of security, violating human rights, serious
criminality, or organized criminality26
• those who came directly to Canada from a country pre-
scribed by Cabinet as being “safe,” other than their own
country of nationality or former habitual residence27
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It is not my intention to comment on all of these provi-
sions—only those where the most significant changes to
the existing legislation have been made. In my view, these
also happen to be the amendments likely to have the great-
est impact in numerical terms: the sections dealing with
serious criminality and previously rejected claims.
Serious Criminality
Under the current legislation, claimants must have been
convicted of a “serious offence,”28 and the Minister must
be of the opinion that they constitute a “danger to the pub-
lic” before they can be found ineligible to have their claims
referred to the crdd.29 In the proposed Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, the Ministerial opinion is not
needed for a finding of ineligibility. The “serious offence”
alone constitutes grounds for not referring a claim to be
heard by the rpd.30
The current practice, of having the Minister label cer-
tain refugee claimants a “danger to the public,” has been
subject to criticism on several fronts. On the government side,
the determinations can be difficult and time-consuming.
From the perspective of refugee advocates, the exercise of
the Minister’s discretion has been criticized primarily be-
cause, as the Canadian Bar Association has observed, “many,
if not most, of those labelled public dangers were not pub-
lic dangers in the objective sense of likelihood to re-
offend.”31 According to the cba, “The public danger label,
rather than a true determination of public danger, is a form
of venting anger against foreigners for past crimes. It is a
modern form of forfeiture.”32
Whatever its shortcomings, there is implicit in the min-
isterial discretion on public danger the acknowledgment
that not all persons convicted of a serious criminal offence
are undeserving of a determination before the Refugee
Board or, indeed, of refugee protection. For example, in
her determinations of public danger, the Minister may con-
sider such factors as the actual sentence imposed by the
court, the age of the offender, whether this was a first of-
fence, indicators of rehabilitation, and change in personal
circumstances since the commission of the crime. None of
these considerations can be taken into account under the
proposed regime. Instead, there is an inflexible and arbi-
trary standard, one that is overly simplistic and, frankly,
insensitive to the complexities that often arise in such cases.
One such complexity involves offences or criminal
charges that are politically motivated. Under the 1951 Con-
vention, only those persons who have committed “serious
non-political” crimes are excluded from refugee protection.33
A distinction is made between common criminals escap-
ing legitimate prosecution and those whose actions were
politically motivated, leading to a flight from persecution.
“Serious criminality,” as defined in Bill c-31, makes no such
distinction. Political and non-political crimes are treated alike.
In fact, in Bill c-31 there is no provision for taking into
account the political context in which crimes abroad were
“committed,” when determining ineligibility by reason of
“serious criminality.” This is problematic, since, in many
countries the criminal justice system is used to suppress
dissidents. It has been said that were Nelson Mandela a refu-
gee claimant under the Immigration and Refugee Protec-
tion Act, he would be ineligible to have his claim heard by
the Refugee Board. A more recent example of the type of
person who would be detrimentally affected by the new
legislation is James Torh, one of Liberia’s most well-known
and outspoken human rights defenders. Mr. Torh was ar-
rested in December 1999 for criticizing the Liberian gov-
ernment and his president, while speaking to a group of
secondary-school students. He was arrested, stripped na-
ked, beaten, kicked, and charged with sedition. In the eyes
of the international community, there is no doubt that the
charges against James Torh are politically motivated. In
Canada, sedition carries a sentence of up to fourteen years’
imprisonment. If convicted in Liberia, where a fair trial is
highly unlikely, James Torh would be ineligible to make a
refugee claim in Canada.34
In the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, there is
an acknowledgment that persons found ineligible due to
serious criminality may still be at risk if returned to their
country of origin and, as a consequence, in need of protec-
tion. Under the Act, those found ineligible for such reason
are referred to the Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (prra).35
The assessment includes a weighing of the potential risk to
the individual if returned to his or her country of origin,
and the risk to the Canadian public or the security of
Canada should the person not be returned.36 Should the
risk to the claimant outweigh the risk to the Canadian pub-
lic, then his or her removal is stayed, subject to further re-
view if circumstances change.37
In terms of protection, it is doubtful that referring “se-
rious criminals” to the prra will be as effective as referring
their claims to the rpd. Under the Immigration and Refu-
gee Protection Act, the definition of risk applied by the rpd
and the prra is the same.38 The only difference in the as-
sessment would be that the former tribunal is far better
trained and equipped to identify persons in need of pro-
tection. Moreover, with respect to the interests of the Ca-
nadian public, it is hard to see the advantages of the pro-
posed system for dealing with claims of “serious criminals.”
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In regard to protecting the public from dangerous crimi-
nals, there already are provisions for detaining any asylum-
seeker who poses a danger to the public.39 Moreover, claim-
ants who have committed serious non-political crimes are
excluded from refugee protection in any event.40 Finally,
persons who have committed serious offences in Canada
and are a danger to the public can still be removed from
Canada, even if in need of protection. Such removals are
consistent with Article 33 (2) of the 1951 Convention and
are provided for both in the current legislation41 and un-
der Bill c-31, where the danger to the public outweighs the
risk to the person concerned.42 What, then, should be done
with cases involving “serious criminality”? Clearly, some
discretion needs to be exercised, in balancing the individu-
al’s need for protection against the public interest, includ-
ing danger to the public. The pertinent questions are, Who
is best suited to exercise that discretion? And at which stage
of the proceedings should the discretion be exercised? One
proposal has been to retain a pre-screening of claims, with
the “danger to the public” criterion being determined by
an adjudicator, instead of the Minister.43 Although this
would result in more independent decision making, it
would continue to be a time-consuming and potentially
costly exercise.
A better solution, in my view, is simply to refer all refu-
gee claims to the rpd.44 Where the eligibility criteria are
met, a hearing on the merits can follow immediately there-
after. This approach would be both expedient and economi-
cal. Moreover, as indicated above, the Refugee Board is best
suited to make determinations on the need for protection.
The practice of denying some people access to refugee de-
termination through a pre-screening mechanism only
serves to increase the likelihood that genuine refugees will
be removed from Canada, thereby violating Canada’s obli-
gations under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention. As the ccr
states in its submissions on Bill c-31, “In order to comply
with this obligation, Canada must, before removal, be sure
that a person being removed is not a refugee. The refugee
determination system [meaning consideration of a claim
by the specialized, expert tribunal] exists to identify who is
a Convention refugee and who is not.”45
Claimants Previously Refused
At first glance, the provision in Bill c-31 for claimants pre-
viously refused refugee protection46 appears identical to that
found in the current legislation.47 It is very similar. The dif-
ference is found in another section of the Bill, dealing with
how soon a rejected refugee claimant can return to Canada
and initiate a subsequent claim. As mentioned above, un-
der the Immigration Act, a period of ninety days outside
the country will overcome the prohibition based on a pre-
vious refusal. Under Bill c-31, persons whose claims are
rejected forever lose their right to have a refugee claim heard
by the Immigration and Refugee Board again.47 Rejected
claimants who, having spent at least one year outside
Canada, return to seek asylum, are referred not to the rpd,
but to the prra instead.49
The rationale for the “ninety-day rule” under the cur-
rent Act is a recognition that circumstances may change—
either in a claimant’s country of origin, or in his or her life,
or both. Just because one’s refugee claim is rejected at one
point does not mean that he or she will never meet the
definition of Convention refugee, or deserve protection, in
the future.
The circumstances that lead to a need for protection, of
course, can arise at any time. Under Bill c-31, however, only
those failed refugee claimants who have been outside of
Canada for one year or more are eligible for prra. No
mechanism exists to provide protection, let alone a risk
assessment, for those who return to Canada seeking asy-
lum within the one-year period. Clearly, the failure to pro-
vide any assessment of risk for such individuals puts into
question Canada’s adherence to its obligations both under
section 7 of the Charter and Article 33 of the 1951 Conven-
tion.50
As mentioned above, in terms of identifying persons in
need of protection, it is unlikely that a review under prra
will be as effective as a determination by the prd. The draft
legislation does not mention who conducts the former or
how it is done. Most likely, it will be a paper review carried
out by immigration officers, similar to the Post Claim De-
termination Officers who consider applications for mem-
bership in the Post Determination Refugee Claimants in
Canada class (pdrcc) under the current legislation. How-
ever qualified these officers may be, they are not members
of a specialized tribunal dealing with protection issues. Nor
can it be said that a paper review is of the same quality as a
hearing. Moreover, where a claim for refugee protection
has previously been refused, “the only new evidence that
may be presented [for prra] is new evidence that arose
after, or that was not reasonably available at the time of,
the rejection.” 51 The meaning of the latter phrase is not
clear. Does it include evidence that was available at the time
of the first hearing, but was not presented due to incompe-
tent counsel or because the claimant was unrepresented?
What about evidence not forthcoming because the claim-
ant was suffering from undiagnosed trauma or domestic
abuse? Ideally, any evidence relevant to the issue of risk
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ought to be considered in a risk assessment. Unfortunately,
the wording of the proposed Immigration and Refugee Pro-
tection Act is not open to such a liberal interpretation.
Presumably, the government’s intention in changing the
“ninety-day rule” into a “one-year rule” was to deter abu-
sive, repeat claims from occurring. However, as the Cana-
dian Bar Association has proposed, “[a]buse through ‘re-
volving claims’ can be dealt with expeditiously through the
doctrine of res judicata, which prevents re-litigation of the
same issues on the same evidence.”52 Moreover, it is likely
that the number of repeat refugee claims will be reduced
under the new legislation because of an appeal on the merits
for failed claimants. Presumably, many repeat claims were
the consequence of the limited appeal that is available to
rejected refugee claimants under the Immigration Act—a
judicial review, with leave, based on error of law, excess or
lack of jurisdiction, a principle of natural justice, or proce-
dural fairness.53 Many failed claimants simply returned to
Canada after ninety days and tried again, hoping for a more
experienced or sympathetic crdd panel, better counsel,
and/or better evidence. With an appeal on the merits, the
incentive to leave Canada and institute a subsequent claim
is greatly diminished.
Claims Abandoned or Withdrawn
Those persons whose refugee claims were previously re-
jected are not the only ones with restricted access to the
Pre-Removal Risk Assessment. Another category of claim-
ants with limited access to the prra are those whose claims
have been abandoned or withdrawn. Such persons are not
eligible for a risk assessment until one year after their de-
parture from Canada.54
There are many reasons that refugee claims are aban-
doned or withdrawn. In the case of the former, it may be
that the individual leaves Canada, or realizes that he or she
does not fit the definition of a Convention refugee. In such
cases, the “one-year rule” may appear to be appropriate.
Other factors, however, may also account for the abandon-
ment of a claim. The claimant may suffer from mental ill-
ness and not have understood the notices sent by the Board.
He or she may have received wrong advice or information
about how to pursue the claim. In some cases, the claimant
may be the victim of domestic abuse and not realize that
Canada is one of the few countries in the world that recog-
nizes it a ground for refugee protection. Alternatively, the
trauma suffered by the abuse, or past incidents of torture
or mistreatment, may have impeded the individual from
proceeding with the claim. In my view, should the claim-
ant be able to present reasonable grounds for abandoning
the refugee claim, he or she should be entitled to a pre-
removal risk assessment.
The most common reason for withdrawing a claim is
that another means of obtaining status in Canada is avail-
able to the claimant, usually through sponsorship. With-
drawing a claim in these circumstances does not necessar-
ily mean that the need for protection disappears. In this
example, should the sponsorship break down, a risk as-
sessment before removal would be appropriate. Again, as
in the cases of previously rejected claim and abandonment,
the provisions of the proposed new legislation are too in-
flexible. That inflexibility could lead to serious human rights
violations being suffered by persons excluded from a pre-
removal risk assessment.
Conclusion
There is a tendency for Canadian politicians to appear
tough as well as fair in their approach to immigration re-
form. Ideally, measures meant to curb abuse of the immi-
gration and refugee system should not diminish our coun-
try’s effectiveness in dealing humanely with those who seek
asylum in Canada. In my view, the restrictions in Bill c-31
on access to the refugee determination process, and to refu-
gee protection in general, do just that. The Bill, though
dying on the order table of the last Parliament, is likely to
re-appear on the new government’s agenda. One would
hope that in its second incarnation, some of its original
toughness will be replaced by a somewhat larger dose of
humanity.
Notes
1. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Caplan Tables New
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,” news release (Ot-
tawa: cic, April 6, 2000) at 1.
2. Ibid., at 2.
3. Ibid., at 3.
4. Ibid.
5. Amnesty International, Amnesty International and Refugee Is-
sues: A Submission to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigra-
tion on Bill c-31 (Ottawa: ai, June 2000) (hereinafter Amnesty
International Brief), at 2.
6. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Comments
on Bill c-31” (Ottawa: unhcr, July 11, 2000) (hereinafter referred
to as the unhcr Brief), at paragraph 39.
7. Ibid.
8. This was a recommendation contained in the Amnesty Interna-
tional Brief, at 2.
9. Immigration Act, s. 45 (1) (a).
10. Ibid., s. 46.01 (1) (a).
11. Ibid., s. 46.01 (1) (c).
12. Ibid., s. 46.01 (1) (d).
Limited Access to Refugee Determination and Protection
61
13. Immigration Act, s. 46.01 (1) (e) (i) (iii) (iv).
14. Ibid., s. 46.01 (5).
15. Section 7 of the Charter states, “Everyone has the right to life,
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be de-
prived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fun-
damental justice.” Section 15 (1) states, “Every individual is equal
before and under the law and has the right to the equal protec-
tion and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and,
in particular, without discrimination based on race, national
or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability.”
16. See, for example, Nguyen v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [1993] 1 F.C. 696; 100 D.L.R. (4th) 151; 18 Imm.
L.R. (2d) 165; 151 N.R. 69 (C.A.); McCallister v. Canada (Minis-
ter of Citizenship and Immigration) [1996] 2 F.C. 190; Gervasoni
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1996], 34
Imm. L.R. (2d) 80.
17. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook
on Procedures for Determining Convention Refugee Status (Ge-
neva: unhcr, 1998) at paragraph 31.
18. unhcr Brief, at paragraph 40.
19. Ibid., at paragraph 37.
20. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the
Situation of Asylum Seekers within the Canadian Refugee Deter-
mination System, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, February 28, 2000.
21. Ibid., at paragraph 68.
22. Bill c-31, An Act Respecting Immigration to Canada and the
Granting of Refugee Protection to Persons Who Are Displaced,
Persecuted or in Danger, Second Session, Thirty-sixth Parliament,
48-49 Elizabeth ii, 1999-2000, s. 148.
23. Ibid., (1) (a).
24. Ibid., (1) (b).
25. Ibid., (1) (c).
26. Ibid., (1) (d).
27. Ibid., (1) (e).
28. “Serious offence” means one for which the potential punish-
ment is ten or more years of imprisonment. If the crime is com-
mitted, or if there has been a conviction outside Canada, one
considers the potential sentence for the “equivalent” offence in
this country.
29. Immigration Act, s. 46.01 (e) (i).
30. Bill c-31, s. 32 (2) (b); s. 95 (1) (d).
31. Canadian Bar Association, Citizenship and Immigration Law
Section, Submission on Bill c-31 (Ottawa: ciba, October 2000)
(hereinafter referred to as the cba Brief) at 87.
32. Ibid., at 88.
33. United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,
Article 1 (F) (b).
34. The arrest, detention, and charge of sedition against James Torh
are described in the 2000 Amnesty International Report, at 159.
35. Bill c-31, s. 107 (4).
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., s. 107 (5), (6).
38. Ibid., section 89, 90 (2), 107 (1) and (2).
39. Ibid., s. 51 (1).
40. Ibid., s. 91.
41. Immigration Act, s. 53 (1).
42. Bill c-31, s. 107 (4).
43. See, for example, the Amnesty International Brief, at 4.
44. This proposal was made by the Canadian Council for Refugees,
Comments on Bill c-31 (Montreal: ccr, July 4, 2000, (hereinaf-
ter ccr Brief) at 21, and the Canadian Bar Association, cba Brief,
at 92.
45. ccr Brief, 21.
46. Bill c-31, s. 95 (1) (a).
47. Immigration Act, s. 46.01 (1) (c).
48. The only exceptions would be those who are successful on ap-
peal or judicial review and have their claims sent back for re-
consideration.
49. Bill c-31, s. 107 (3) (a).
50. Article 33 of the 1951 Convention states, “No Contracting State
shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threat-
ened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group or political opinion.”
51. Bill c-31, s. 107 (3) (b).
52. cba Brief, at 95.
53. Immigration Act, s. 82.1 (1); Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7,
as amended, s. 18.1 (4).
54. Bill c-31, s.107 (3) (a).
Michael Bossin is a lawyer at Community Legal Services in
Ottawa, specializing in immigration and refugee law. He
teaches immigration law at the University of Ottawa Law
School and is the president of the Canadian Section of
Amnesty International (English-speaking branch).
